May 2015 - Elections in the United Kingdom: the future of Europe in question

Nathalie Brack, Centre for the Study of Politics - CEVIPOL

Nathalie Brack, observers have said that David Cameron has fallen into his own trap with Brexit. Did he play his poker hand badly, hoping to bluff through?

David Cameron was serious when he made the promise of a referendum on staying in the European Union. But, at the beginning, the promise was above all addressed to the Eurosceptic faction within the Conservative Party, during Cameron's campaign for the Tory leadership. It then became one of the arguments in the general election campaign, in order to win back the Eurosceptic electorate and prevent it from voting UKIP, which is relatively surprising because the majority of the British people were above all concerned with questions related to the economy, employment, immigration, healthcare, etc. Once elected, the Prime Minister had to clarify his strategy: he would campaign for the "Yes" vote, provided that he could obtain European Union reforms.

On 10 November, in a letter to the President of the European Council, David Cameron set out his conditions. Could you remind us what they were?

Indeed, on 10 November, he sent this letter and made a speech to the British public detailing his demands for European Union reforms in four main areas. Firstly, competitiveness, with support for the European Commission to legislate less (but better) and an appeal for global free-trade agreements. Secondly, economic governance, with a plea for better recognition of the status of non-eurozone members. According to Cameron, States which are not members of the eurozone should not be negatively affected by decisions taken by members of the eurozone, and every decision concerning economic and monetary governance affecting the whole of the EU should be taken by all of the States. Thirdly, he insists much on national sovereignty, demanding on the one hand that the United Kingdom be exempt from the Treaty objective to move towards an "ever-closer Union", and on the other hand that national parliaments be able to block European legislation. Finally, immigration is one of the sensitive subjects: Cameron is calling for restrictions on free movement within Europe, notably for future new member states as well as the possibility of fighting against "abuse" of the benefits system (for example by restricting access to unemployment benefits and social housing).

Can these conditions be considered reasonable?

It is important to note that these demands are the result of informal discussions that Cameron has held with the various Heads of State and Government. He first tested the waters before issuing his demands. Nevertheless, that does not mean that they are seen as reasonable by all of his partners or by the European institutions. As far as competitiveness is concerned, this is on the European Commission’s work agenda, and is therefore not the most contentious point. And this allows David Cameron to continue to receive the support of British industry. A discussion on the role of national parliaments should also be possible. However, the question of economic governance, and above all that of immigration, might prove to be a lot more contentious. The free movement of European citizens has been at the heart of European construction since the Treaty of Rome and it is unacceptable for certain Member States to call it into question. It remains to be seen what Cameron manages to obtain from his partners and the European institutions on this issue. Finally, he is demanding legal guarantees. If this entails a revision of the Treaties, that would obviously complicate things where timing is concerned, and also because each State could then put their own demands on the table, and several, including Belgium, could take advantage of this to call for greater integration on certain aspects. Certain demands will thus be more difficult to meet and it is likely that we will see distinct coalitions emerge on each of the questions raised by David Cameron in his letter.

Would the European Union weaken itself in accepting a "variable-geometry Europe"?

There already exist different forms of integration in the European Union: the United Kingdom, for example, is neither in the eurozone nor in the Schengen Area. Belgium has a vision of a great European federalism, which Germany and France also back, even if it is sometimes discreetly, but this is just one vision of Europe. Others exist. We already have a de facto variable-geometry Europe.

Another potential crisis is looming for Europe: the integration of ‘new’ states such as Catalonia, for example.

The question of the membership of a hypothetical Republic of Catalonia would effectively place Europe in a difficult position. While very popular a few years ago, the concept of a "Europe of the regions" has today been abandoned to some extent. Each time a new member joins, there is tense debate, but here it would be particularly tense, because not only would Spain’s attitude be important, but also the position adopted by other States that are also facing separatist claims. But beyond the various tensions and crises, it should be noted that these States are pro-European. And overall, Europe conforms to a pragmatic model: whenever there is a crisis, the European Union discusses, adapts and moves forward, certainly slowly, but it's fairly healthy.