June 2018 -The Salvini government is formed in Italy

Caroline Close, Centre d'étude de la vie politique (CEVIPOL)

After Fidesz in Hungary and PiS in Poland, the Salvini government is now ruling Italy; what might explain the rise of the far right and populism in Europe? Is it fair to draw comparisons with 1930s Europe, Caroline Close?

Yes, it's a fair comparison. In 1930, like today, far-right ideologies were on the rise against a backdrop of economic and social hardship. In addition, these parties have come to power in the past few years though the democratic process. They attract the unsatisfied—voters who are displeased with their own economic status and with the ‘traditional’ political elites who they believe are unable to meet their hopes and expectations. These elites are also accused of being corrupt and putting their own interests above those of the people; such accusations are borne out by political scandals. However, comparisons with the 1930s also fall short in some regards. The rise of extremism in Europe in the first half of the 20th century (in Italy and Germany, but also in Central and Eastern Europe) came in the wake of World War I and its devastating aftermath, such as the colossal reparations required from Germany and the loss of territories. The current crisis, on the other hand, follows a period of prosperity —e.g. with the Golden Sixties— and several waves of democratisation. In addition, rivalries between European states have been quelled within the European Union, an institution that populist parties are now opposed to.

During the recent municipal elections in Belgium, French-speaking citizens voted for alternative parties on the left of the political spectrum (Ecolo-Groen, PTB). Why is the far right in the Wallonia-Brussels Fédération Wallonie-Bruxelles not as successful as it has been in other areas?

There are a number of factors at play here, but I believe three are the most salient. First, the Walloon FN's organisational weakness. The party has never managed to build itself into an efficient organisation, one that can massively recruit members and supporters and create durable strategies for campaigning and communication. Second, the weakness or absence of far right parties in French-speaking Belgium does not mean that there are no potential voters for this type of group. Voters with ethnocentric tendencies (i.e. against immigration) can be found in the ‘underclass’ as well as in higher or wealthier segments of the population, although they might not all vote for the same parties: the lower class still mainly votes for left-wing parties (PS and PTB), while the ethnocentric vote in the higher class goes to the MR (and, sporadically and in low amounts, to the People's Party). This same MR has, over the past few months, been moving to the right, with more emphasis on security and ethnocentrism, in line with the preferences of this voter group. Finally, while these ethnocentric attitudes are reinforced by a strong nationalist sentiment in Flanders, this is much less true among French-speaking voters.

Could the recent municipal elections predict the 2019 federal elections, with opposite results in the north and south of the country?

It is fair to wonder —perhaps even to worry— about the results of the federal elections in 2019. At such a high level of governance, it is increasingly difficult to form a coalition that makes up a majority of seats in both of the country's linguistic groups. If forecasts on the number of seats in the Chamber of Representatives should come true, N-VA and Vlaams Belang could take over nearly half of Dutch-speaking seats on their own. The ‘Swedish coalition’ could be prolonged, with an even lower representation of the French-speaking side than in 2014 due to the losses incurred by MR in Wallonia and Brussels. This could be compensated somewhat by CDH entering the government, but it is now only the fourth party in Wallonia. Furthermore, it is likely that a coalition will be formed without the support of a majority of French speakers, which will cause discontent among this group. This might drive some French-speaking voters to call for increased separation from Flanders… in other words, confederalism, which Bart de Wever is a major proponent of.